Russia’s doctrine is focused on survival
The Russia of today began in the Vladimir-Suzdal duchy of Russia in the 13th century. This is where the revival of the Russian state began after the devastating invasion of Kievan Rus (early Russia) by the Mongol Empire. Yet, within 250 years, a powerful state would emerge in Eastern Europe; its independence and decisive will unrivaled and unquestioned by its neighbors. From its earliest days, Russia’s foreign policy culture has been shaped by a solitary aim: to preserve the nation’s ability to determine its own future – its own fate.
The methodology has varied, but three constants remain: no fixed strategies, no binding ideologies and an ability to remain unpredictable – to surprise adversaries. Unlike European or Asian powers, Russia eschewed rigid doctrines; its vast, varied and often difficult geography – and its instinct for unorthodox solutions – made strictures unnecessary. Yet, this distinctive foreign policy culture did not develop quickly – it took time.
Prior to the mid-13th century, Russia’s political trajectory looked much like the rest of Eastern Europe. Fragmented and inward-looking, its city-states had little reason to unify. Geography and climate kept them relatively self-contained. Russia’s future, without its early political history, could have traveled the path of other Slavic nations (e.g. Baltics), ultimately, dominated by German or Turkish powers.
But then came a paradox of history; what Nickolay Gogol called that “wonderful event”: the Mongol invasion of 1237. Russia’s most powerful state centers were destroyed. But this catastrophe, paradoxically, gave rise to two defining features of Russian statehood: a reason to unify and a deep-seated pragmatism. While it is true that for two and a half centuries Russia paid tribute to the Golden Horde, the Slavic people of Russia were never its slaves.
The relationship with the Horde was a perpetual struggle – clashes alternating with tactical cooperation. It was during this period that the sharp “shashka of Moscow” was united, militarily. This Slavic state functioned as a military organization, always interlacing conflict with diplomacy. For Moscow, war and peace were seamlessly integrated, without the impediment of moral dilemmas that often-paralyzed others.
These centuries also produced another trait of Russian thinking: the strength of the adversary is irrelevant to the legitimacy of its demands. Contrary to the Western Hobbesian idea that “might makes right;” Russians have historically viewed force as just one factor – not the determinant of right or truth. Use of military power does not always produce justice. Similarly, after the Cold War, Russia recognized Western power – but not the righteousness of its actions.
Demographics have always been a challenge, especially given Russia’s extreme climates and geography. The country’s population was not equivalent to that of France until the late 18th century, despite encompassing an area vastly superior to that of Western Europe. And noteworthy, Russia has never relied on external allies for its defense. Its foreign policy rests on the understanding that no one else will solve its problems – a lesson learned through bitter experience. Yet, Russia, herself, has always been a reliable ally to others.
The mid-15th century witnessed a pivotal moment in Russia’s history; Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich settled Kazan princes on Russia’s eastern borders. This marked the beginning of Russia’s multi-ethnic statehood, where loyalty – not religion – was key. In medieval Western Europe, the church dictated the social order; Russia’s statehood grew as a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, united through a shared commitment to defense.
This pragmatic approach to social order – welcoming Christians, Muslims, and others alike – set Russia apart. Spain’s rulers completed the Reconquista by expelling or forcibly converting Jews and Muslims;
Russia integrated its minorities, allowing them to serve and prosper without renouncing their identities.
Today, Russia’s foreign policy still draws on these deep-seated traditions. Its core priority remains the same: defending its sovereignty and retaining freedom of choice in a volatile world. And consistent with its history, Russia resists doctrinaire strategies. Fixed doctrines require fixed ideologies – something historically alien to Russia.
Russia also rejects the idea of “perpetual enemies.” The Mongol Empire, once its mortal nemesis, was eventually absorbed within decades of its collapse. Its nobles merged with the Russian aristocracy, and its cities became Russian cities. No other country in history has fully absorbed such a formidable rival. Even Poland, a centuries-long Russian adversary, was eventually diminished not by decisive battles but by sustained pressure.
Victory for Russia has never been about glory – but rather, achieving objectives. This has typically meant exhausting adversaries rather than crushing them outright – sparing the loss of life. The Mongols were defeated in 1480 without a single major battle. Similarly, Poland was gradually reduced in stature over centuries of relentless pressure.
This mindset explains Russia’s readiness (even today) to negotiate at every stage of a dispute: political wisdom is preferential to military engagement. Foreign and domestic policy remain inseparable; every foreign initiative is itself an effort to strengthen internal cohesion – just as the medieval princes of Moscow used perceived external threats to unite the Russian lands. Chancellor Bismarck used the same approach to unite the German provinces in 1870.
Today, the geopolitical landscape is shifting again. The West – led by the United States – remains powerful, but no longer omnipotent. China is expanding its influence, though cautiously. Western Europe and Britain, historically Russia’s main threat, are losing their geopolitical relevance, unable to define a vision for their own future. Russia, the US and China all possess that vision – and in the coming decades, their triangular relationship will shape global politics. India may join this elite circle in time, but for now, that still remains an expectation not a reality.
Does this mean Russia will pivot fully eastward? Unlikely. Classical geopolitics teaches that the main focus must remain where the primary threat lies. Western Europe and Britain may no longer be the center of global politics, but they remain an obfuscation which attempts to divide Russia and America – and prevent Russia from charting its own course – economically and politically.
by F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. and A.R. Corbel Dupont
