The campaign is widely seen as part of CCP leader Xi Jinping’s broader strategy of power consolidation under the guise of fighting corruption within the party.
A few weeks before China’s key annual meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” analysts saw signs of another wave of anti-corruption campaigns led by the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, potentially targeting top communist officials previously spared.
This campaign is widely seen as part of Xi’s broader strategy of power consolidation under the guise of fighting corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The Two Sessions is scheduled to begin on March 4.
On Feb. 16, Beijing’s official magazine republished a speech by Xi from last year, emphasizing that the anti-corruption initiative remains “severe and complex” and that Politburo members “must play an exemplary role.”
No one would have a get-out-of-jail-free card for corruption, Xi had previously told top disciplinary officials. “There will be no iron-cap princes,” he said, referring to a special nobility title during China’s last dynasty. In exchange for their services to the founding emperor of the Qing Dynasty, these grand dukes could pass down their titles and privileges to future generations without downgrades.
The equivalents to the grand dukes would be current and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), a seven-member exclusive club of the highest ruling organ of the CCP.
The first time “iron-cap princes” appeared in the official propaganda was in January 2015, the third year since Xi took over the Party. One grand duke he spared was Zeng Qinghong, a former PSC member who controlled China’s petroleum industry. In return, Zeng supported Xi’s rule within the CCP.
Experts say that a high-profile target in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign could be Zhang Youxia, the second-in-command in the Central Military Commission. Xi may aim to reclaim an absolute grip on the military ahead of the Two Sessions, the regime’s annual plenary sessions, where the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference meet simultaneously in Beijing.
Signs that Xi’s military power had been weakened began to reveal themselves last July.
PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese military, also called the People’s Liberation Army, started promoting a group decision-making mechanism opposite to the “centralized, unified leadership”—the one-man rule Xi had been championing.
The tone of personal worship toward Xi in state-run media also noticeably cooled.
By Jessica Mao and Olivia Li
