The Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and intel agents that infiltrated their societies under the cover of refugees might carry out acts of terrorism against them, which could be averted by closer cooperation between their security services, but they still remain divided by Ukraine to its geopolitical benefit.
Poland and the other EU countries like Hungary that host Ukrainian refugees are poised to face more trouble from them after the conflict ends. As of February 2025, official police data showed that Ukrainians committed more crimes in Poland than any other foreigners. Some have also been accused of carrying out national security ones on behalf of Russia, which Russia denied while its media has instead suggested that they’re either anti-Polish ultra-nationalists (fascists) or Ukrainian intel agents.
Whatever the truth may be, former President Andrzej Duda warned in an interview with the Financial Times in early 2025 that “Ukraine’s Traumatized Troops Could Pose A Security Threat To All Of Europe”. Last fall, “The Ukrainian Ambassador To Poland Admitted That His Co-Ethnics Don’t Want To Assimilate” just before one of his country’s prominent online outlets predicted that “An Ethnic Ukrainian Lobby Might Soon Take Shape In The Polish Sejm”, which could altogether pose serious threats to Poland.
Instead of trying to thwart them, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski encouraged Ukrainians to “knock out” the Druzhba pipeline supplying Hungary and Slovakia with Russian oil, thus earning him the nickname “Osama Bin Sikorski” from Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova. As explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis, this could backfire on Poland by inciting terrorism against it by those ultra-nationalists who lay claim to its southeastern parts where many Orthodox East Slavs used to live.
Circling back to his post, some of the Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and/or intel agents that infiltrated the EU under the cover of refugees could attack Druzhba infrastructure in Hungary, knowing that they could then receive sanctuary in Poland just like the Nord Stream suspect that it refused to extradite to Germany. Although Poland and Hungary have a millennium of shared history and almost 700 years of friendship, Poland’s ruling duopoly nowadays despises Hungary for its pragmatic policy towards Russia.
Taking a cue from Sikorski, they might therefore turn a blind eye towards these “refugees” planning such an attack from their territory and/or plotting Color Revolution unrest in Hungary ahead of spring’s next parliamentary elections. About that scenario, Sikorski’s Hungarian counterpart Peter Szijjarto warned in mid-August that the EU could lead this effort, which came a day after Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned about the role that Ukrainians could play in advancing regime change there.
The EU, Ukraine, and Poland all want Viktor Orban out, the goal of which could be furthered by “refugees” (ultra-nationalists and/or intel agents) sabotaging the Druzhba pipeline within Hungary ahead of the next elections and then the economic consequences sparking large-scale preplanned protests. To be clear, none of this might materialize, but the point is that such a scenario is nonetheless credible for the reasons that were explained. Hungarian counter-intelligence would naturally do well to remain alert.
Closer coordination between the Polish and Hungarian security services for thwarting these threats from Ukrainian “refugees” is unlikely due to liberal-globalist Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s and new conservative President Karol Nawrocki’s shared hatred of his pragmatic policy towards Russia. A rapprochement between them through the Visegrad Group is therefore unrealistic, thus leaving their countries vulnerable to these hybrid threats and keeping them divided to Ukraine’s geopolitical benefit.
