February 6, 2002

Dear Michael,

Thank you for taking some time yesterday to talk with me about the request for proposal to acquire new electronic voting machines in the counties of Georgia. I have reviewed the request for proposal, including the audit trail

section. I could not find any stated requirement, which ensures citizens can verify that their vote is electronically recorded for the candidates they actually chose. Many of my fellow citizens and I believe that such a requirement is absolutely mandatory to protect the Constitutional rights of the citizens as well as to preserve open, honest and free elections in Georgia.

In addition, it appears that this requirement cannot currently be satisfied by any of the voting machines that have been certified for use in Georgia. As a computer consultant with over 30 years of experience, I know that

electronic voting machines can easily be programmed to distort voting results and still go undetected in pre-election tests or certifications. For example, voting machines can be programmed to:

* Distort vote counting after a certain number of ballots are counted;
* Distort vote counting on certain days;
* Distort vote counting after a vote is received for a certain abnormal combination of candidates;
* Distort vote counting after receiving a signal via a modem that is used to transfer results;
* Distort vote counting as results are transferred from a precinct to a central tabulation machine;

The vast majority of electronic voting machines available today do not have the type of audit trail that I have described to guard against corruption. A simple audit trail that could be implemented to protect the citizens from

corruption would work like this:

* A unique sequentially generated number should be assigned to each electronically recorded ballot by the voting machine;
* As a ballot is completed, the number can either be displayed or printed for voters, who can choose to write the number down, memorize it or take the receipt showing the number with them;
* When the polls close, the machines should print the votes of all ballots ordered by the unique ballot identification number and totaled for public posting at the precinct;
* Once poll workers have publicly posted the detail precinct results, voters could view the results and match their number against the detail to verify that the machine correctly recorded the vote;

In this manner, the identity of the voter is still private, no one knows how any individual voted and the voter has the assurance that the vote was recorded correctly. I have found one machine that employs this type of concept and will continue to look for others. That machine, called Vote Trakker, is made by Avante International Technology Inc. in Princeton Junction, New Jersey. Regardless of the machine, vendor or particular audit trail, I believe that the principal of a verifiable vote count must be upheld for each citizen.

If I have misunderstood any of the facts or am unaware of other specific alternatives that achieve the same principal, please inform me of the details. My phone number is (770) 993-3622. Because of the critical nature of this subject matter I request the favor of a written reply. Thank you again for your time, consideration and efforts to improve voting in Georgia.

 Sincerely,

Garland Favorito

220 Tallow Box Dr.

Roswell, Ga. 30076

P.S. I attached a Word document with this same letter and will follow that up with a certified hard copy. My Email is garlandf@msn.com. Thank you.