The Wall” fell in ‘89; yet, for 35 years the West has proceeded as though it was still intact. It’s time to let go of our Cold War mentality – a foreign policy built on it is contrary to what is in the best interest of the United States as well as Europe.
Western democracies seek long-term stability. To achieve this, the West must no longer ostracize Russia as a veritable pariah state. The predicate for such treatment is based on a perception of Moscow as the old Soviet Union, generated through a pre-1989 Cold War lens. Moreover, consideration must be given to the political intrigues which ensued after the fall of the Wall in ‘89.
There is valid, well-documented evidence that NATO leaders were not forthcoming with the “Russian Bear” since the Cold War ended. Promises were made but never kept. Assurances were given – but by people with short memories.
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security. Gorbachev and other Soviet officials received reiteration of these assurances throughout the process of German reunification in 1990 and 1991. Declassified US, Soviet, German, British and French documents posted December 12, 2017 by the National Security Archive at George Washington University attest to this.
There appears to be a structural fallacy in the West’s orientation vis-a-vis Russia, today. The view of the USSR as a threat during the Cold War was valid. The Warsaw Pact was real and its purpose clear. Today, however, “the Pact” no longer exists – not even the Russian president sees Russia as athreat to the EU or NATO.
Today, the West must follow a new path, one not dictated by a political view created over 70 years ago and designed to fight a Cold War adversary. It is a view grounded in “containment” foreign policy which was the logic behind military interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Latin America and Grenada.
President Trump has already begun the journey down a new path. During the recent Saudi Peace Conference, the president indicated his intent to reset the US-Russia economic and political relationship. One such move is to bring Russia back into the economically powerful G-7 group of countries. Moreover, the US and Russia are working towards an agreement whereby the US would participate in developing Russia’s substantial mineral deposits. Talks have reportedly focused on natural resource exploration, trade routes, and energy collaboration inclusive of the Arctic region.
This is an important first step towards long-term global geopolitical stability.
But additional steps should be taken with regard to the issue of Russia and US security interests to reduce tensions and build mutual trust towards greater stability.
The Russia of today (with its market economy and — prior to February 2022 – a substantial energy source for EU economies) should be considered through the lens of Realpolitik. From the vantage point of Western security interests, Russia should be within an expanded frame of reference – rather than necessarily over against it.
Security is built on Realpolitik (not ideology) and that means pragmatism, not emotion. If the aim of Western security policy is to mitigate the potential for future conflicts by fostering long-term stability, then (unpalatable though it might seem) discussions with the Russian “Bear” must commence. The most opportune time to negotiate with Russia would have been before the Ukraine conflict began. But a missed chance need not become a missed opportunity.
The longer the West delays the inevitable dialogue with Russia, the greater the likelihood of further conflicts. Knowns are better than unknowns. Realistic perceptions are to be preferred to faulty ones. Understanding the terms of Russia’s position (even if peripheral) in a more comprehensive Western security frame of reference is critical to long-term stability.
Given the understandable reciprocal lack of trust between Moscow and the West, an exclusively adversarial approach is a “Mobius twist” in which one ends up back where one started – with conflict and instability. The endless sanctions, military deterrence and strategic containment have failed to achieve their objectives and thereby increased the likelihood of future conflict. The challenge is finding a middle path (mutual understanding) between deterrence and confrontation. Keeping Russia outside will only build suspicion and predispose to instability.
Unfortunately, this is the approach Europe is taking with its new $580 billion defense package – ostensibly aimed at Russia which is already no match for NATO.
Rather than Russia remaining indefinitely outside the construct of Western security, a new model should be developed that does not predispose to instability, future conflicts and upholds international norms of behavior.
The Cold War era offers a valuable model. At the zenith of U.S.-Soviet tensions, diplomatic channels remained open and arms control agreements which limit, reduce and verify nuclear forces helped restrain competition for superiority. President Trump is already advocating for arms reduction discussions.
Similar mechanisms can be developed today. In fact, a basis through which such mechanisms could be developed already exists. Russia need not be viewed as an ally; rather, its presence, understood within the frame of reference of Western security, could build mutual trust as both countries understand Russia’s place to not be (by default) antagonistic to the West. Such an effort promotes stability rather than what we have today – destabilization and conflict.
An economic reengagement towards Moscow must be considered. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated recently that sanctions relief must also be part of any peace agreement with Ukraine. President Trump seems to be moving in that direction as reflected in comments from the US-Russia Saudi Peace Conference regarding the Ukraine conflict.
Reintegration of Russia into European energy markets could help stabilize global energy supplies, strengthen faultering EU economies and begin to build trust once again.
A final, obvious reason to seek a more integral reengagement with Russia is its potential to undermine a burgeoning Russia-China relationship. The robust rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing poses increasing challenges for the West. The West’s idea of isolating Russia entirely has pushed the latter closer to China, strengthening an already troublesome potential adversary.
The West and this is especially true of EU and British leadership (which seem to have almost personal enmity for Russia in general and President Putin in particular) must decide to either work towards a security frame of reference that includes, rather than isolates, Russia – or embrace the status quo – of another Ukraine or worse.
