The “major statement” on Russia that Trump earlier hyped up turned out to be a clumsy attempt to thread the needle between radically escalating US involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict and walking away from it. His new three-pronged approach includes: 1) the rapid dispatch of up to 17 Patriot missile systems to Ukraine; 2) more arms sales to NATO countries who’ll in turn transfer them to Ukraine; and 3) up to 100% secondary sanctions on Russia’s trading partners if a peace deal isn’t reached in 50 days.
In the order that they were mentioned, each corresponding move is aimed at: 1) bolstering Ukraine’s air defenses in order to decelerate the pace of Russia’s continual on-the-ground gains; 2) helping Ukraine reconquer some of its lost land; and 3) coercing China and India into pressuring Russia into a ceasefire. The first two goals are self-explanatory, with the second being unrealistic given the failure of Ukraine’s much more heavily armed counteroffensive in summer 2023, while the third requires some elaboration.
China and India’s large-scale imports of discounted Russian oil have served as crucial valves from Western sanctions pressure by helping to stabilize the ruble and thus Russia’s economy in general. Even though these imports also help their own economies, Trump is wagering that they’ll at the very least curtail them in order to avoid his threatened 100% secondary sanctions. He might make an exception for the Europeans and Turks, who also purchase Russian resources, on the pretext of them arming Ukraine.
By focusing on Russia’s two largest energy importers, Trump is trying to greatly reduce the budgetary revenue that the Kremlin receives from these sales while sowing further divisions within the RIC core of BRICS and the SCO, expecting as he is that at least China or India will partially comply at minimum. Prior to his deadline, he envisages that their leaders – who are years-long close friends with Putin – will try to pressure him into the ceasefire that the West wants, though it’s unknown whether they’d succeed.
In any case, Trump is poised to place himself in a dilemma entirely of his own making if one of them doesn’t comply with his demand to stop trading with Russia, or if one or both only do so in part. He’d either have to delay the imposition of his threatened 100% secondary sanctions on all their imports, lower the level, or reduce the scale to only apply to their companies that still trade with Russia otherwise there could be serious blowback, especially if China is the one that doesn’t fully comply.
His preliminary trade agreement with China, which he described in early May as a “total reset” in their ties, could collapse and thus raise prices across the board for Americans. As regards India, their ongoing trade talks could collapse too, which could create an opening for advancing the nascent Sino-Indo rapprochement whose existence was cautiously confirmed by its top diplomat on Monday. Each case of blowback, let alone both of them at the same time, could be very detrimental to American interests.
Trump’s attempt to thread the needle therefore isn’t just clumsy, but it could also majorly backfire, thus raising the question of why he agreed to do so. It looks like he was misled into thinking that Putin would agree to a ceasefire that doesn’t resolve the root security-related causes of the conflict in exchange for a resource-centric strategic partnership. When Putin declined, Trump took it personally and imagined that Putin was playing him, which led to Trump’s advisors manipulating him into this escalation as vengeance.
