Trump proposed in a social media post over the weekend that NATO stop buying Russian oil and start tariffing China 50-100% as part of his plan for swiftly ending the Ukrainian Conflict. He promised to impose “major sanctions on Russia” if all NATO members at least do the first-mentioned. This proposal is unrealistic though since the whole reason why some NATO members continued buying Russian oil (including indirectly via India) was to manage global prices and thus prevent a full-blown recession.
Likewise, imposing 50-100% tariffs on China would lead to price spikes all across the board that would compound with dumping Russian oil to deal a heavy blow to the EU, though that might be what Trump wants in order to bankrupt EU companies and thus give US ones a greater edge. Of relevance, observers shouldn’t forget that the EU subordinated itself as the US’ largest-ever vassal state via their lopsided trade deal over the summer, so manipulating it into a recession would advance US interests even more.
The same goes for the recent report that Trump also wants the EU to impose 100% tariffs on India. Even though he and Modi exchanged pleasantries on social media during that same week while confirming that trade talks remain ongoing, the US still has an interest in subordinating India. Derailing its rise as a Great Power, whether through these means and/or possibly trying to Balkanize it, would help perpetuate the US’ declining unipolar hegemony a little longer and perhaps even reverse this trend with time.
Trump should be careful what he wishes for, however, since the EU’s hypothetical fulfillment of his proposals vis-à-vis Russia, India, and China (RIC) might backfire by bringing all three closer together. The incipient Sino-Indo rapprochement, which was inadvertently brought about by US pressure on India, is already a major development. Add to it the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline deal that Russia agreed to with China on the sidelines of the SCO Summit and multipolar processes might soon further accelerate.
Nevertheless, it can’t be assumed that the EU will deal such a heavy blow to its own economy with all the self-inflicted political consequences that could entail such as popular unrest and the potential replacement of its ruling elite during the next elections. Trump either overestimated the US’ influence over the EU or perhaps he cynically expects them not to implement his proposal and only shared it as an off-ramp for justifying any possibly forthcoming decision to distance the US from the conflict.
At the same time, he’s reportedly considering American support for an EU-imposed no-fly zone over at least part of Ukraine as one of the West’s security guarantees, and he might even try to dangerously make this a fait accompli if the warmongers like Lindsey Graham who still have his ear get their way. These concerns make it difficult to conclude exactly what Trump’s motives are so it can’t be ruled out that he might still escalate US involvement in the conflict even if the EU doesn’t implement his proposal.
All in all, there are three plausible scenarios for what might happen: 1) the EU complies by crashing its own economy in exchange for the US escalating its involvement in the conflict; 2) the EU doesn’t comply but the US still escalates; and 3) the EU doesn’t comply so the US distances itself from the conflict on this pretext. The coming weeks will therefore clarify Trump’s evolving policy towards the Ukrainian Conflict in particular and RIC more broadly as his team scrambles to reformulate the US’ Eurasian grand strategy.
